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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                            ---------- 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 On September 30, 1993, defendant Michael David Alston 
("Alston") was indicted on two counts.  Count I charged him with 
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371: (i) to defraud the United 
States and the Treasury and (ii) to structure to avoid the 
reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), in violation of 
the anti-structuring provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) and 
§ 5322.  Count II charged him with structuring in violation of 31 
U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), § 5322(b); 31 C.F.R. § 103.11, § 103.22; and 
18 U.S.C. § 2(b).  Following a non-jury trial, Alston was 
convicted on both counts. 
 After Alston was convicted, the Supreme Court rendered 
its opinion in United States v. Ratzlaf, -- U.S. --, 114 S. Ct. 
655 (1994), in which it held that, in order to obtain a 
structuring conviction, the government must prove that the 
3 
defendant "willfully" structured.  "Willfulness" was defined as 
the defendant's knowledge that structuring was illegal.  The 
government conceded that it had not proven the mens rea 
(knowledge of illegality) that Ratzlaf required in order to 
sustain Count II, the substantive count of structuring and that 
portion of Count I that charged conspiracy to structure.  The 
district court therefore vacated those portions of Alston's 
conviction.  However, the district court refused to set aside 
Alston's conviction under Count I which charged a § 371 
conspiracy to defraud, reasoning that Ratzlaf's mens rea 
requirement did not apply. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We will reverse because the indictment, in 
charging under the "defraud" clause of § 371, (Indictment ¶7(a)), 
alleges no more than a conspiracy to defraud the United States by 
structuring, a far different conspiracy than the genre of "Klein 
conspiracies"0 relied on by the government.  In addition, we have 
such substantial difficulty in understanding how Alston can be 
convicted of a conspiracy to defraud by structuring when he 
cannot be guilty of a conspiracy to structure or of structuring 
itself,0 that we reverse Alston's conviction. 
                                                           
0A "Klein conspiracy" is discussed at note 13, infra. 
0In this opinion, we discuss only Alston's argument that his §371 
conspiracy must be vacated, as we find no merit in Alston's other 
ground for appeal, i.e., that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence of Alston's failure to file tax 
returns in 1987 and 1988. 
     Alston had also originally raised a third ground for appeal: 
that the district court had erred in enhancing his offense level 
by two levels for obstruction of justice.  However, by letter 




 On July 28, 1988, Alston, operator of an unprofitable 
convenience store, and his brother Henry each arranged to 
purchase top-of-the-line BMW automobiles from West German Motor 
Imports for approximately $70,000 apiece.0  The sales contract on 
each car provided that a down payment of $41,000 would be paid 
toward the purchase price of the car on or before the date of 
delivery, and that the remainder of the purchase price would be 
financed.  The salesman was co-defendant Richard Rosa.  Alston 
and his brother each left a personal check for $500 toward their 
respective down payments. 
 Alston's car became available on September 12, 1988.  
Alston made cash remittals to Motor Imports of $5,000 on 
September 30, 1988, $2,500 on October 4, 1988, and $1,500 on 
October 5, 1988, for a total of $9,000 within that week.  A 
single $10,000 cash payment would have triggered Motor Imports's 
obligation to file an IRS Form 8300 for cash payments over 
$10,000.0 
                                                           
0After factoring in all costs, each vehicle cost approximately 
$83,000. 
0Internal Revenue Code section 6050I requires "[a]ny person . . . 
who is engaged in a trade or business, and who, in the course of 
such trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in cash in 1 
transaction (or 2 or more related transactions)" to file a return 
identifying the person from whom the cash was received, the 
amount of the cash received, and the date and nature of the 
transaction.  26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a), (b).  Structuring 
transactions to evade the reporting requirements of § 6050I is 
prohibited.  26 U.S.C. § 6050I(f). 
     Because the statute of limitations for structuring under 
section 6050I had run, Alston was not charged with such a 
violation. 
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 On October 5, 1988, Alston paid cash for a $9,000 money 
order payable to Motor Imports from Therese Drew, the head bank 
teller at Stenton Avenue Branch of Meridian Bank and a close 
personal friend of Alston's, who also kept the books for Alston's 
convenience store.  At trial, Drew testified that she knew about 
the currency transaction report ("CTR") filing requirements 
imposed by law and had discussed the CTR filing requirements with 
Alston.  On October 7, 1988, Alston purchased with cash another 
$8,000 money order payable to Motor Imports from the Stenton 
Avenue Branch of Meridian Bank. 
 A similar pattern was followed for the purchase of 
Henry Alston's BMW, and on December 9, 1988, both Michael and 
Henry Alston took delivery of their new cars. 
 On September 30, 1993, Alston was charged in two counts 
of a three count indictment.  Count I charged Alston with 
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371:  (i) to defraud the United 
States and the Treasury and (ii) to structure to avoid the 
reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a),0 in violation of 
the anti-structuring provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)0 and 
                                                           
0In 1970, Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), which provided 
that financial institutions such as banks are obligated to file 
CTR's for cash transactions in excess of $10,000.  See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5313(a) (reporting requirement); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) 
($10,000 floor).  
0In 1986, Congress enacted an "antistructuring" provision, 31 
U.S.C. § 5324, which provides that no person shall, "for the 
purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) 
. . . structure . . . any transaction with one or more financial 
institutions."  31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). 
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§ 5322.0   Count II charged Alston with the substantive offense 
of structuring, that is, evasion of the reporting requirements of 
31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), in violation of the anti-structuring 
provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), § 5322(b); 31 C.F.R. 
§103.110, § 103.22;0  and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).0 
                                                           
0
 At all times relevant to this appeal, 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) 
provided criminal penalties only for "willful" violations of 
§ 5313 or 5324.  Prior to its amendment in 1994, § 5322 read as 
follows: 
 
A person willfully violating this subchapter 
[31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.] or a regulation 
prescribed under this subchapter (except 
section 5315 of this title or a regulation 
prescribed under section 5315) shall be fined 
not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not 
more than five years, or both. 
 
31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).  Section 5324 was subsequently amended in 
1994 to provide its own penalty provision.  The 1994 amendment 
did not impose a "willfulness" requirement.  See n. 12, infra. 
0Section 103.11(gg) of the C.F.R. defines "structuring" as 
follows: 
 
Structure (structuring).  [A] person structures a 
transaction if that person, acting alone, or in 
conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, 
conducts or attempts to conduct one or more 
transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more 
financial institutions, on one or more days, in any 
manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting 
requirements under section 103.22 of this part.  "In 
any manner" includes, but is not limited to, the 
breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding 
$10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or below 
$10,000, or the conduct of a transaction, or series of 
currency transactions, including transactions at or 
below $10,000.  
 
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg). 
0Section 103.22(a)(1) of the C.F.R. provides that "[e]ach 
financial institution other than a casino or the Postal Service 
shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of 
currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such 
7 
 On November 17, 1993, a non-jury trial was held.  On 
November 18, 1993, Alston was convicted of all counts.  The 
district court sustained Alston's conviction relying on the Third 
Circuit law in effect at that time.  Our jurisprudence then 
provided that to obtain a structuring conviction, the government 
need only prove that the defendant knew of the financial 
institution's obligation to report financial transactions of over 
$10,000, and that the defendant structured his transactions in 
order to avoid triggering such reports.  See United States v. 
Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 873 
(1994).  The district court concluded that Alston knew of the 
bank's reporting requirements from his conversations with Drew, 
and that he had intentionally structured his transactions to 
avoid having CTR's filed with the IRS. 
 On January 11, 1994, after the trial, but before the 
district court ruled on Alston's post-trial motions, the Supreme 
Court held that in order to obtain a structuring conviction the 
government must prove that the defendant knew that structuring 
itself was illegal.  United States v. Ratzlaf, -- U.S. --, 114 S. 
Ct. 655 (1994). 
 Alston moved to set aside the verdict and sought the 
entry of a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
financial institution which involves a transaction in currency of 
more than $10,000."  31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1). 
0Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), a person who causes an act to be done 
which if directly performed by himself would be an offense 
against the United States, is punishable as if he had committed 
the act himself.  18 U.S.C. § 2(b).  In this case, Count II of 
the indictment charged Alston under § 2(b) with causing the bank 
to fail in its statutory duty to file CTR's.  
8 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The government conceded that it had 
not proven knowledge of illegality.  It therefore conceded that 
Alston's convictions for structuring and conspiracy to structure 
under § 5324 and § 5322 could not stand. 
 By order filed April 6, 1994, the district court 
granted Alston's post-trial motion to set aside the verdict with 
respect to the substantive count of structuring and so much of 
Count I that had charged conspiracy to structure (Indictment 
¶ 7(b)).  The district court entered a judgment of acquittal on 
those charges.  The district court refused, however, to set aside 
Alston's conviction under that portion of Count I that had 
charged conspiracy to defraud, (Indictment ¶ 7(a)).  It did so on 
the ground that Ratzlaf's mens rea requirement did not apply to  
§ 371 conspiracies to defraud. 
 On November 29, 1994, Alston was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of one year and one day for conspiracy to defraud 
the United States, as charged in Count I of the indictment. 
 
II. 
 Section 5313 of title 31 of the United States Code, and 
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) promulgated thereunder, provide that 
banks and other "financial institutions" must file CTR's for cash 
transactions of $10,000 or more.  In 1986, Congress enacted 31 
U.S.C. § 5324 and § 5322 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986.  Section 5324 provides that it is illegal for an individual 
to "structure," that is, to conduct one or more cash transactions 
at one or more financial institutions, for purposes of evading 
9 
the financial institution's reporting requirements under 31 
C.F.R. § 103.22.  Structuring includes reducing a sum of cash 
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums.  Because, prior to 1994, 
section 5324 did not itself contain a penalty provision, its 
penalty provision was supplied by section 5322(a), which provided 
that "a person willfully violating" section 5324 was subject to 
criminal penalties. 
 We originally interpreted the term "willful" in 
§ 5322(a) to mean knowledge of the bank's reporting requirements 
under § 5313 coupled with the intent to evade those requirements. 
United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1390-92 (3d Cir. 1992). 
However, in Ratzlaf v. United States, -- U.S. --, 114 S. Ct. 655 
(1994), the Supreme Court held that the term "willful" in 
§ 5322(a) required proof beyond knowledge of a bank's reporting 
duties and intent to evade them.  Ratzlaf for the first time 
required that the government prove that the defendant "knew the 
structuring in which he engaged was unlawful."  Ratzlaf, -- U.S. 
at --, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (emphasis added).  Thus, at all times 
relevant to this appeal, structuring was one of the few crimes 
for which the government had to prove knowledge of illegality. 
See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699  (1995).0 
                                                           
0After the Supreme Court decided Ratzlaf, Congress eliminated the 
willfulness requirement for structuring convictions by amending 
18 U.S.C. § 5324 to contain its own criminal penalty provision.  
The penalty provision of § 5324, unlike § 5322, does not require 
willfulness.  1994 Riegle Community Development and Regulation 
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2253 
(1994).  Thus, following the 1994 amendment, the mens rea 
requirement for a structuring conviction is met if the government 
10 
 As earlier noted, the government conceded following 
trial that it had failed to prove that Alston knew it was illegal 
to avoid CTR's, and agreed that Alston's convictions for the 
substantive offense of structuring and conspiracy to structure 
should be vacated.  However, the government maintained that 
Alston's structuring may nonetheless be punished as the object of 
a "Klein conspiracy"0 under the "defraud" clause of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371.  The district court agreed and declined to vacate the 
charge against Alston for conspiracy to defraud the United States 
under § 371. 
 
III. 
 Section 371, the general federal conspiracy statute, 
provides as follows: 
If two or more persons conspire either to 
commit any offense against the United States, 
or to defraud the United States, or any 
agency thereof in any matter for any purpose, 
and one or more of such persons do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy each 
shall be [subject to criminal penalties]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
merely establishes that the defendant had the purpose of causing 
a financial institution to not file a required report. 
     In light of the 1994 amendment to § 5324, we observe that 
the instant situation is unlikely to occur again. 
0The term "Klein conspiracy" comes from the Second Circuit case 
of United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), and has 
become the generic term for a conspiracy to frustrate the 
government (particularly the IRS) in its lawful information 
gathering functions.  See, e.g. United States v. Montalvo, 820 
F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendant convicted under the defraud 
clause of § 371 for conspiracy to impede the IRS in the 
ascertainment and collection of revenue by laundering money in 
order to disguise the true source of United States currency). 
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18 U.S.C. § 371.  Section 371 refers to two types of 
conspiracies: (1) conspiracy to commit a substantive offense 
proscribed by another statute (the ""offense" clause"); and (2) 
conspiracy to defraud the United States (the ""defraud" clause"). 
See United States v. Vazquez, 319 F.2d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 1963). 
While the "offense" clause requires reference to another part of 
the criminal code, the "defraud" clause does not, simply because 
the substantive offense (fraud) is contained in the statute 
itself. 
 It is well settled that to convict a defendant of 
conspiracy under the "offense" clause, the government must prove 
whatever level of mens rea is required for conviction of the 
underlying substantive offense.  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that "in order to sustain a judgment of conviction on a charge of 
conspiracy to violate a federal statute [under the "offense" 
clause of § 371], the Government must prove at least the degree 
of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself." 
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685-86 (1975) (citing 
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974)).0 
 In order to convict a pre-1994 structuring defendant, 
the government must prove "willful" violation of the anti-
structuring statute, that is, knowledge of the illegality of 
structuring, Ratzlaf v. United States, -- U.S. --, 114 S. Ct. 655 
(1994).  A pre-1994 conspiracy to structure must also be 
                                                           
0As Justice Jackson once stated, conspiracy, "chameleon-like, 
takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent 
offenses on which it may be overlaid."  Krulewitch v. United 
States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1940). 
12 
dismissed absent a showing of a "willful" violation.  Thus, "it 
is necessary to establish knowledge of the illegality of 
structuring in order to convict a defendant for conspiracy to 
structure financial transactions."  United States v. Kim, 65 F.3d 
123, 126 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing conviction for conspiracy to 
structure where the jury was not instructed to find that the 
defendant had knowledge of the illegality of structuring).  It 
was obviously for these reasons that the district court in the 
instant pre-1994 case dismissed the substantive charge of 
structuring as well as the charge of § 371 conspiracy to 
structure. 
 After the district court dismissed all but the charge 
of § 371 conspiracy to defraud, of which Alston was convicted, 
the issue then remaining before us was whether Alston, in light 
of Ratzlaf's pre-1994 standard of willfulness -- a standard since 
amended (see footnote 12, supra) -- could be convicted of a 
conspiracy to defraud by structuring without proof of knowledge 
of illegality.  In United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 
1994), we answered that question in connection with the Federal 
Election Campaign Act.  We held that the standard that applied to 
the substantive offense also applied to § 371 conspiracy to 
defraud.  Here, we answer that question consistent with Curran's 
principle and holding and require that a conviction to defraud 
the United States by pre-1994 structuring must also be supported 
by proof that the defendant knew that structuring was illegal.0 
                                                           
0Judge Roth, writing in dissent (dissent typescript page 24) 
claims that we have misread United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 
13 
 The defendant in Curran had asked his employees to make 
individual contributions to the election campaigns of certain 
candidates for federal office.  He then reimbursed them in cash, 
thereby circumventing the maximum campaign contributions 
permitted to any individual under federal law.  Following trial, 
Curran was convicted on charges of causing election campaign 
treasurers to submit false reports to the Federal Election 
Commission (the "FEC"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) and  
§ 1001,0 and of conspiracy to defraud the United States under 
§ 371. 
 Like the antistructuring statutes, § 1001 punishes only 
"willful" conduct.  We held that "willfully" causing a violation 
of the disclosure obligations under the Federal Campaign Act, was 
no different than "willfully" causing the failure by a bank to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(3d Cir. 1994).  She charges that our reading of Curran would 
lead to a conflict with United States v. Vasquez, 319 F.2d 381 
(3d Cir. 1963).   
     Vasquez, however, said no more than:  "[t]he latter 
conspiracy [to defraud the United States] is itself the 
substantive offense, and a count of an indictment drawn under it 
need refer to no other statute than § 371" -- a statement to 
which we have referred in text, supra, at page 11.   
     Curran, therefore, cannot conflict with Vasquez:  first, 
because the Vasquez statement is dicta and second, because each 
of the two cases deals with vastly different subject matters and 
with vastly different principles.  Hence, neither Vasquez nor any 
other authority cited by the dissent trenches upon the principle 
that where the Supreme Court or Congress has identified and 
specifically considered particular conduct and has ruled 
specifically with respect to that conduct, as the Supreme Court 
has ruled in Ratzlaf, effect must be given to the ruling and 
standard prescribed not only for the specific offense but also 
for the conspiracy to commit that offense.  
0Section 1001 prohibits the making of a false statement or the 
concealment of a material fact within the jurisdiction of a 
department or agency of the United States.  18 U.S.C. § 1001.   
14 
file a CTR under the Bank Secrecy Act.  Curran, 20 F.3d at 568-
69.  Thus, applying Ratzlaf, we defined "willfulness" in cases 
brought under § 2(b) and § 1001 in the Federal Election law 
context to require the prosecution to prove "that defendant knew 
of the treasurers's reporting obligations, that he attempted to 
frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his conduct was 
unlawful."  Curran, 20 F.3d at 569. 
 Because the Curran court's "willfulness" instruction 
was legally deficient in that it did not charge the jury that 
Curran had to have knowledge of the illegality of his actions, we 
vacated Curran's convictions on the substantive counts, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  Most significantly, however, we 
vacated Curran's § 371 "conspiracy to defraud" conviction because 
critical aspects of Curran's mens rea were lacking, including 
proof that he knew his actions to be illegal.  We held that the 
district court's misstatement of the legal standard for 
"willfulness" "undermined not only the substantive counts, but 
the conspiracy [to defraud] one as well.  The essence of 
conspiracy is an agreement to commit an act that is illegal." 
Curran, 20 F.3d at 571.  "The comments we have previously made 
about the failings of the instruction on intent apply to the 
conspiracy [to defraud] count as well."  Id.  "On retrial, the 
instruction on intent as to the conspiracy count must track those 
applicable to the substantive counts."  Id. (quoting United 
States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 
1100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989)). 
15 
 Both logic and our decision in Curran dictate our 
holding here.  The government in this case has conceded that it 
has failed to prove that Alston "willfully" structured under 
Ratzlaf.  Therefore, the charge against Alston for conspiracy to 
defraud, which was premised exclusively on Alston's structuring 
activity, must be vacated for failure to prove the mens rea 
(knowledge of illegality) required not only by the underlying 
substantive offense of structuring, but also by the conspiracy to 
defraud by structuring. 
 In the present case, the indictment, in charging Alston 
with conspiracy to defraud, relied exclusively on allegations of 
his structuring activity.  The indictment reads in relevant part: 
 From on or about July 28, 1988 to on or 
about December 9, 1988 in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, defendants 
 
MICHAEL DAVID ALSTON, and 
RICHARD ROSA 
 
did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully 
conspire, combine, confederate, and agree 
together with an unindicted co-conspirator, 
and others unknown to the grand jury: 
 
 a. to defraud the United States and 
the Department of the Treasury, an agency of 
the United States, by impairing, obstructing, 
and defeating its lawful governmental 
function of collecting data and reports of 
currency transactions in excess of $10,000; 
and 
 
 b. to knowingly and willfully 
structure, and attempt, aid, abet and cause 
the structuring of, financial transactions 
with a domestic financial institution for the 
purpose of evading the reporting requirements 
of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), in violation of 31 
U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). 
 
16 
 "Structuring" entails the breaking down 
of large amounts of U.S. currency into 
smaller amounts of less than $10,000 
preliminary to transacting business with a 
financial institution in an attempt to avoid 
the CTR reporting requirements. 
 
Indictment ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 
 The indictment, in charging conspiracy to defraud, 
asserts only that Alston impaired the United States and Treasury 
"in its lawful governmental function of collecting data and 
reports of currency transactions in excess of $10,000," language 
that sounds in structuring.  Indeed, the entire indictment speaks 
only to structuring activities and contains no allegations that 
Alston defrauded the government in any other respect.  Because 
the indictment is narrowly drawn to rest solely on the alleged 
facts of structuring, and because it is conceded that Alston 
lacked the requisite mental state to be guilty of structuring, 
Alston's conviction on unspecified broader grounds cannot be 
sustained.  See United States v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (where indictment was narrowly drawn to state that 
defendants conspired to defraud the IRS in its collection of 
information with regard to currency transactions, the defendant 
could not be convicted of conspiracy to defraud based on his 
money laundering operations). 
 Moreover, the government has conceded that its theory 
against Alston for fraud against the United States is nothing 
more than structuring.  See Gov't Supp. Mem, June 30, 1995 at 2 
("[T]he basis for our definition of the underlying legal 
obligation/legal prohibition to make out a case of an agreement 
17 
to defraud the government is found at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)."). 
As a consequence, the government offered the same body of 
evidence at trial to support both the charge against Alston for 
"conspiracy to defraud" and the charge against him for 
"conspiracy to structure."  The government neither charged, nor 
attempted to prove at trial, that Alston engaged in any 
fraudulent activity separate from, or in addition to, what can 
only be characterized as "structuring." 
 Despite this concession and the proof at trial, and 
even though the only charges found in the indictment describe the 
act of structuring, the government argues that Alston's 
"conspiracy to defraud" conviction did not require proof of the 
"willfulness" required for a structuring conviction.  The 
government contends instead that Alston was guilty of 
participating in a so-called "Klein conspiracy" "to defraud the 
United States by obstructing or impeding the IRS in its functions 
and duties under the Bank Secrecy Act to collect analyze, and 
disseminate information contained in CTR reports."  (Appellee's 
Brief at 11).0   Because establishing a true Klein conspiracy 
                                                           
0As previously explained, supra at 10 n.13, the term "Klein 
conspiracy" is derived from United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958).   A Klein 
conspiracy is comprised of three elements: "(1) the existence of 
an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in 
furtherance of the [agreement's] objectives, and (3) an intent on 
the part of the conspirators to agree, as well as to defraud the 
United States."  United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 956 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  Several courts have sustained Klein convictions when 
the evidence sufficed to prove an accompanying "intent and 
purpose of impeding and obstructing the IRS in the collection of 
revenue and the performance of its duties."  U.S. v. Vogt, 910 
F.2d 1184, 1203 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 
(1991).  See United States v. Montalvo, 820 F.2d 686, 690 (5th 
18 
under the "defraud" clause does not generally require proof of 
knowledge of illegality, the government contends that its proof 
that Alston knew of the bank's CTR filing requirements is a 
sufficient showing of mens rea to sustain his conviction for 
conspiracy to defraud. 
 We cannot discern any difference between the 
government's "defraud" scenario and the "structuring" scenario of 
which Alston was acquitted.  Both conspiracies involve 
structuring prior to the 1994 amendment to § 5324.  Therefore, 
given the indictment and the proofs at trial, we conclude that to 
obtain a conviction under either the "defraud" or "offense" 
clause of § 371, the government had to prove that Alston knew 
that his structuring activities were illegal.  See Ratzlaf, 
supra.  Although we do not foreclose the possibility of 
convicting a defendant under § 371's "defraud" clause based on 
charges in addition to or different from pre-1994 acts of 
structuring, as we have just discussed, the present indictment, 
under paragraph 7(a), charged no more or less than a straight-out 
structuring conspiracy. 
 Notably, the cases that have upheld convictions for 
conspiracy to defraud under § 371 have all involved additional 
charges in the indictment and additional evidence produced at 
trial, over and beyond that required for a conviction for pre-
1994 structuring.  For instance, in United States v. Jackson, 33 
F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995), 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cir. 1987);  United States v. Browning, 723 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
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the Seventh Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions for 
conspiracy to defraud under § 371 despite reversing their 
antistructuring convictions. 
 In Jackson, however, the indictment, in charging the  
§ 371 "defraud" count, "never mentions a structuring violation or 
the relevant antistructuring statutes."  Id. at 870. Furthermore, 
Jackson involved extensive "other evidence" beyond structuring 
activity demonstrating a conspiracy to defraud the United States, 
id. at 868, including record evidence that the defendants had no 
wage or other income, id. at 869, and yet had spent over $300,000 
to purchase homes and exotic automobiles. Id. at 869. 
 Because, in the present case, the charge against Alston 
for "conspiracy to defraud" was nothing more than a charge of 
conspiracy to structure, we will reverse Alston's conviction 
where his conviction was not based on proof that he had 
"willfully" structured, as required under Ratzlaf.  Where either 
Congress or the Supreme Court has spoken on the required level of 
mens rea required to obtain a conviction for structuring, the 
government may not subvert that mandate by juggling the "defraud" 
and "offense" clauses of § 371 so as to substitute one for the 
other. 
 If the "offense" clause of § 371 specifically covers an 
act or offense and the indictment charges only that act or 
offense as having been committed, and the proofs at trial reveal 
no more than such acts of offense, a defendant not guilty under 
the "offense" clause cannot alternatively be convicted under the 




 Because the indictment here charged no more than a 
conspiracy to defraud the United States by structuring and the 
proofs at trial established no more than a conspiracy to defraud 
















Roth, Circuit Judge: Dissenting 
 
 Appellant Michael David Alston appeals his conviction 
of conspiracy to defraud the United States and the Department of 
the Treasury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The district court 
found that Alston engaged in a Klein conspiracy with the intent 
to "impair, obstruct and defeat the lawful government function of 
collecting data and reports of currency transactions" by 
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arranging his bank transactions to avoid the reporting 
requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1). 
United States v. Alston, Crim. No. 93-445-1 at 11 (Apr. 6, 1994); 
Appellant's App. at 41.  Because I believe that the evidence is 
sufficient to support a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§371, I would affirm the district court.  Therefore, I dissent.  
 The majority believes that because the conviction for 
conspiracy to defraud the United States is "premised exclusively 
on Alston's structuring activity," the government must 
demonstrate the same mens rea for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§371 as is necessary for a conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5322. 
Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 15].  I disagree. 
 Section 5322 requires that a defendant "willfully" 
commit a violation.  The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
"willfulness" requirement to mean that a defendant who 
intentionally commits unlawful acts must also have known that his 
actions were unlawful.  Ratzlaf v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
114 S.Ct. 655, 657, 663 (1994).  Section 371, in contrast, 
imposes no such "willfulness" requirement, and we should not 
create one.  As we stated in United States v. Vazquez, a § 371 
conspiracy to defraud "is itself a substantive offense, and a 
count of an indictment drawn under it need refer to no other 
statute than § 371."  319 F.2d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 1963).  Thus 
there is no logical reason to apply the willfulness requirement 
contained in § 5322 when § 371 encompasses the entire statutory 
charge against Alston. 
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 The government, having failed to prove the requisite 
mens rea for conviction under one statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5322, has 
obtained a conviction under another more general statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  Section 371 requires only a showing that Alston 
intentionally committed unlawful acts -- not a showing that he 
knew his actions to be unlawful.  The fact that the two charges 
are premised on the same factual scenario is of no legal 
significance in this case.  There is nothing unusual or improper 
in the government's alternative characterization of the same 
facts, so long as both theories are alleged in the indictment, as 
they were here.  Indictment, Count I at ¶ 7(a)-(b); App. at 12a; 
Id. at Count II, ¶ 2; App. at 17a. 
I 
 Alston was originally convicted on two counts of a 
three count indictment.  Count I charged Alston in two subparts 
with conspiracy to defraud the United States and the Department 
of the Treasury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and with 
conspiracy to structure for the purpose of evading the reporting 
requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a).0  Alston, Crim. No. 93-445-1 
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 Count I reads in pertinent part: 
 
7.  From on or about July 28, 1988 to on or about 
December 9, 1988 in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, defendants 
 
MICHAEL DAVID ALSTON, and 
RICHARD ROSA 
 
did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully conspire, 
combine, confederate, and agree together with an 




at 1; Appellant's App. at 31; Indictment, Count I at ¶7(a)-(b); 
App. at 12a.  Count II charged Alston with "structuring" a 
financial transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5324(a)(3).  
Alston, Crim. No. 93-445-1 at 1; Appellant's App. at 31; 
Indictment, Count II at ¶ 2; App. at 17a. 
 The structuring and conspiracy to structure charges 
were prosecuted pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5322, which provided that 
defendants must be convicted of "willfully violating" the anti-
structuring laws.0  At the time of Alston's indictment and trial, 
we interpreted the "willfulness" mens rea requirement in §5322 to 
mean that a defendant had to have "knowledge of the legal 
reporting requirements and the intent to prevent the bank from 
furnishing the required information." United States v. Shirk, 981 
F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (3d Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted), vacated, 
___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 873 (1994) (citing Ratzlaf v. United 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  a.  to defraud the United States and the 
Department of the Treasury, an agency of the 
United States, by impairing, obstructing, and 
defeating its lawful governmental function of 
collecting data and reports of currency 
transactions in excess of $10,000 . . .. 
 
  b.  to knowingly and willfully structure, and 
attempt, aid, abet and cause the structuring of, 
financial transactions with a domestic financial 
institution for the purpose of evading the 
reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). 
 
Indictment, Count I at ¶ 7; App. at 12a. 
0
 Section 5324 has since been amended to add a criminal penalty 
provision so that a prosecution can now be brought directly under 
that statute without reference to § 5322.  See United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1262 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 1994 
Riegle Community Development and Regulation Improvement Act, 
Pub.L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2253 (1994)). 
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States.  ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994)).  The government did 
not have to prove that the defendant knew that he was violating 
the law by structuring his transactions. 
 After the conclusion of Alston's bench trial, the 
Supreme Court decided Ratzlaf v. United States.  ___ U.S. ___, 
114 S.Ct. 655 (1994).  Ratzlaf interpreted the word "willfully" 
as it then appeared in 31 U.S.C. § 5322 to require that the 
government show not only that a defendant intended to circumvent 
a bank's obligation to report currency transactions but that the 
defendant knew that his efforts to circumvent those requirements 
were unlawful.  Id. at 657, 663.  In light of Ratzlaf, Alston 
filed post-trial motions to set aside his convictions.  The 
district court, with the government's acquiescence, vacated the 
structuring charge in Count II and the conspiracy to structure 
charge in Count I and acquitted Alston of these crimes. 
 Despite Ratzlaf, the district court affirmed Alston's 
conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States and the 
Treasury Department in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The court 
held that Alston was "a co-conspirator in a scheme to prevent the 
United States from receiving information to which it is entitled 
when a bank files a CTR . . .."  Alston, Crim. No. 93-445-1 at 
14; Appellant's App. at 44.  The court distinguished Ratzlaf "on 
the basis that its analysis of the willfulness element centers on 
the use of the term 'willfully' in the antistructuring statute 
found at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(b) and 5324(a)(3)."  Id.0  Because 
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 As the majority notes, 31 U.S.C. § 5322 imposed criminal 
penalties only for "willful" violations of §§ 5313 or 5324 at all 
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§371 does not contain an analogous willfulness element, the court 
did not require proof that Alston knew that his actions were 
unlawful. 
 The district court's analysis is clearly correct.  At 
the time Alston was charged and convicted, the relevant portion 
of § 371 provided as follows: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any 
offense against the United States, or to defraud the 
United States, or any agency thereof in any matter for 
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act 
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 371.  In United States v. Vazquez, we explained that 
this general conspiracy statute 
 
condemns two types of conspiracies:  One, to commit 
substantive offenses against the United States 
specified under other statutes.  The other to defraud 
the United States.  The latter conspiracy is itself the 
substantive offense, and a count of an indictment drawn 
under it need refer to no other statute than § 371. 
319 F.2d at 384 (emphasis added) (citing Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1942)); see also United States v. 
Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States 
v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
times relevant to this appeal.  Prior to its amendment in 1994, 
§5322 read as follows: 
 
A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 U.S.C. 
§ 5311 et seq.] or a regulation prescribed under this 
subchapter (except section 5315 of this title or a 
regulation prescribed under section 5315) shall be 
fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not 
more than five years, or both. 
 
31 U.S.C. § 5322(a). 
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v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1004 (1989); United States v. Rosengarten, 857 F.2d 76, 78 
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1011, (1989)); United 
States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1200 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
 Section 371 "reaches 'any conspiracy for the purpose of 
impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any 
department of Government.'"  Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 
855, 861 (1966) (citations omitted).  Klein conspiracies, for 
example, may be prosecuted under the "defraud" clause of § 371. 
See United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 474-75 (3d Cir. 
1977) (acquitting defendants of Klein conspiracy because there 
was no basis for jury finding of intent "to impede and obstruct 
the functions of the Internal Revenue Service"); United States v. 
Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 
(1958), and cert. denied sub nom., Haas v. United States, 355 
U.S. 924 (1958), and cert. denied sub nom., Alprin v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 924 (1958); see also United States v. 
Derezinski, 945 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Farm & Home Savings Assoc., 932 F.2d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied sub nom., Meyer v. United States, 502 U.S. 860 
(1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Williams v. United States, 502 
U.S. 860 (1991); United States v. Cambara, 902 F.2d 144, 145-47 
(1st Cir. 1990). 
 Klein conspiracies are conspiracies to defraud the 
United States by obstructing or impeding the Internal Revenue 
Service in the collection of taxes or in its lawful functions and 
27 
duties to collect, analyze, and disseminate information contained 
in CTRs.  Derezinski, 945 F.2d at 1010; Farm & Home Savings 
Assoc., 932 F.2d at 1260; Cambara, 902 F.2d at 145-47.  A Klein 
conspiracy consists of three elements:  "(1) the existence of an 
agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in 
furtherance of the [agreement's] objectives, and (3) an intent on 
the part of the conspirators to agree, as well as to defraud the 
United States."  United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 956 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  Knowledge of illegality is not an element of a Klein 
conspiracy.  As the majority concedes, a conviction under the 
"defraud" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires a lesser showing of 
intent than does a conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5322.  Majority 
Op. at ___ [slip op. at 17-18] ("establishing a true Klein 
conspiracy under the 'defraud' clause does not generally require 
proof of knowledge of illegality . . .."). 
 The district court convicted Alston of a Klein 
conspiracy based upon several transactions conducted by or on 
behalf of Alston between October 5 and October 7, 1988.  On 
October 5, Alston purchased from Meridian Bank a $9,000 money 
order payable to West German Motor Imports to be used toward the 
purchase of a new BMW.  On October 6, 1988, Alston had co-
conspirator Rosa purchase from Provident National Bank a $6,000 
cashiers check payable to West German.  The following day, 
October 7, 1988, Alston purchased with cash an $8,000 money order 
payable to West German from Meridian Bank.  That same day, Alston 
purchased a second money order at Meridian Bank for $6,500 with a 
cash advance from a credit card.  All of these negotiable 
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instruments were delivered to West German and credited toward 
Alston's purchase of the BMW.0 
 Alston conducted three of these four transactions 
through Terese Drew, a bank teller at Meridian Bank.  Drew, who 
became head teller at Meridian in 1986 or 1987, described herself 
as a "very close friend" of Alston.  Drew knew about the CTR 
reporting requirements imposed by law.  The district court 
concluded that Drew discussed the CTR requirements with Alston 
some time before the events that led to the indictment.  The 
court discounted Drew's statement that she did not believe that 
Alston knew of the CTR requirements because "it appeared to be 
part of her attempt to protect the defendant and it was asking 
her to speculate as to the defendant's state of mind."  Alston, 
Crim. No. 93-445-1 at 10 n.5; Appellant's App. at 40. 
 Furthermore, the parties stipulated that Alston failed 
to file income tax returns for the calendar years 1987 and 1988. 
Based upon this evidence, the district court concluded that 
Alston arranged his transactions because "he did not want his 
name called to the attention of the Internal Revenue Service as 
someone who was financially capable of making large cash payments 
but nevertheless had failed to file income tax returns." Id. at 
11; Appellant's App. at 41. 
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 Alston presumably paid West German in negotiable instruments in 
order to avoid triggering West German's duty to file an IRS Form 
8300 reporting a series of cash transactions in excess of 
$10,000.  No criminal indictment was brought for failure to file 
8300 forms because the applicable three year statute of 
limitations for this offense had already run.   
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 The district court summarized its understanding of 
these facts as follows: 
The circumstantial evidence presented at trial shows 
that the overt acts were done willfully and resulted in 
the bank failing to file CTRs because the transactions 
occurred on separate days and at separate banks in 
amounts less than $10,000 and were done with the 
purpose of preventing CTRs from being filed. 
Id. at 14; Appellant's App. at 44.  Thus the district court found 
all three elements necessary for conviction of a Klein conspiracy 
under 18 U.S.C. § 371:  (1) an agreement between Alston and Rosa, 
(2) "overt acts" in furtherance of that agreement, and (3) an 
intent to defraud the United States of the CTRs to which it was 
entitled under 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1). 
 Alston possessed the requisite mens rea for a § 371 
conviction because these overt acts were done "with the purpose 
of preventing CTRs from being filed."  No other mens rea is 
necessary for conviction.  As the majority itself acknowledges, 
"[s]everal courts have sustained Klein convictions when the 
evidence sufficed to prove an accompanying 'intent and purpose of 
impeding and obstructing the IRS in the collection of revenue and 
the performance of its duties.'"  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. 
at 18 n.16] (citing United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d at 1203; 
United States v. Montalvo, 820 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Browning, 723 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
 Ratzlaf is inapposite because it discusses a different 
statute with a different mens rea requirement.  The Supreme Court 
stressed in Ratzlaf itself that it did not discard "the venerable 
principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a 
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criminal charge."  Ratzlaf, 114 S.Ct. 655, 663 (1994).  The Court 
simply made an exception in one instance pursuant to a specific 
decree from Congress.  Id.  Because there is no "willfulness" 
requirement in § 371, Ratzlaf does not apply, and the government 
is not required to prove that Alston knew that his actions were 
illegal.  The majority should not graft an additional mens rea 
requirement onto § 371 when it is warranted by neither the words 
of the statute nor Supreme Court precedent. 
II 
 To understand how the majority came to impose this 
additional mens rea requirement on a § 371 conspiracy to defraud 
case, it is helpful to examine the majority's general approach to 
the issue.  The majority reverses Alston's conviction for 
conspiracy to defraud the United States because it has 
"substantial difficulty in understanding how Alston can be 
convicted of a conspiracy to defraud by structuring when he 
cannot be guilty of a conspiracy to structure or of structuring 
itself . . .."  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 3-4] (footnote 
omitted).  The majority never lays the facts of this case and the 
elements of a Klein conspiracy side by side to determine whether 
the facts satisfy the elements necessary for conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 371.0  Instead, the majority emphasizes the similarity 
between the factual scenario supporting the structuring and 
conspiracy to structure charges and the factual scenario 
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 When the majority does address the government's Klein 
conspiracy theory, it does so in a perfunctory manner, dismissing 
it as "a far different conspiracy" than the one alleged in the 
indictment.  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 3]. 
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supporting the conspiracy to defraud charge -- a consideration 
that I believe is irrelevant. 
 The majority opinion proceeds along two closely linked 
lines of reasoning.  First, the majority identifies a perceived 
deficiency in the indictment.  According to the majority, the 
indictment does not adequately allege a Klein conspiracy 
independently of the structuring and conspiracy to structure 
charges.  See Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 3]; see also Id. 
at ___ [slip op. at 16].  Second, the majority argues that Alston 
cannot be convicted of a conspiracy to defraud the United States 
based upon the same factual scenario used to support the 
unsuccessful structuring and conspiracy to structure charges. 
Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 3-4, 15, 17-20].  I will address 
these contentions in turn. 
The Indictment 
 Count I of the indictment clearly indicates the 
government's intention to seek a conviction of Alston under 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  The language in the indictment mirrors relevant 
statutory and judicial pronouncements on § 371 and Klein 
conspiracies.  The indictment alleges in pertinent part that 
Alston and Rosa conspired 
a. to defraud the United States and the Department of 
the Treasury, an agency of the United States, by 
impairing, obstructing, and defeating its lawful 
governmental function of collecting data and reports of 
currency transactions in excess of $10,000 . . .. 
Indictment, Count I at ¶ 7(a); App. at 12a. 
 Section 371 penalizes individuals who "conspire . . . 
to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof . . .."  18 
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U.S.C. § 371.  In Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court 
elaborated on this statutory language, noting that § 371 covers 
not only fraud but any conspiracy for the purpose of "impairing, 
obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department 
of government . . .."  384 U.S. at 861 (citations omitted).  The 
language of paragraph 7(a) of the indictment closely tracks the 
language of § 371 and Dennis.  It is therefore clear that the 
government intended to charge Alston with a violation of § 371 
for obstructing lawful governmental functions. 
 A Klein conspiracy, which may be prosecuted under §371, 
is a conspiracy "to interfere with or obstruct one of [the 
government's] lawful governmental functions . . .."  Klein, 247 
F.2d at 916.  Obstruction of lawful government functions is 
exactly what was alleged in paragraph 7(a) of the Alston 
indictment.  Alston was accused of impairing and obstructing the 
government's lawful function of "collecting data and reports of 
currency transactions in excess of $10,000 . . .."  The 
indictment in Klein was "framed to make a general charge of 
impeding and obstructing the Treasury Department in the 
collection of income taxes . . .."  Id. at 916.  Likewise, the 
indictment in this case was framed to make a general charge of 
impeding and obstructing the Treasury Department in the 
collection of CTRs.  See Derezinski, 945 F.2d at 1010; Farm & 
Home Savings Assoc., 932 F.2d at 1260; Cambara, 902 F.2d at 145-
47. 
 The district court understood the indictment to allege 
a Klein conspiracy, and Alston has not disputed that the 
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indictment charges a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 371 that is separate 
from the structuring and conspiracy to structure charges. 
Paragraph 7(a) clearly alleges a Klein conspiracy to thwart the 
government's lawful purpose in collecting information from CTRs.0 
 The majority argues that United States v. Murphy 
supports its argument concerning the insufficiency of the Alston 
indictment.  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 16].  The 
indictment in Murphy was narrowly drawn to state that defendants 
conspired to defraud the IRS in its collection of information 
with regard to currency transactions.  809 F.2d 1427, 1431-32 
(9th Cir. 1987).  Specifically, the § 371 conspiracy to defraud 
charge rested "solely on the alleged falsehoods in the CTR 
[defendant] filed."  Id.  The court found, however, that 
defendant had in fact filed an accurate CTR.  Id. at 1429-32. 
Therefore, the § 371 charge alleged in the indictment was 
manifestly unsupported by the evidence. 
 The government argued that although the CTR alone could 
not support a conviction on the § 371 charge, the court should 
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 The majority argues that "the entire indictment speaks only to 
structuring activities and contains no allegations that Alston 
defrauded the government in any other respect."  Majority Op. at 
___ [slip op. at 16].  The majority's characterization of the 
activities in the indictment as "structuring activities" begs the 
question.  Whether Alston engaged in "structuring" activities is 
a legal question, not a factual matter.  We could assume a 
different result just as easily by insisting that the indictment 
alleges only "Klein-conspiracy activities" and that the language 
in indictment paragraph 7(a) "sounds in Klein-conspiracy." 
 The "Overt Acts" section of the indictment alleges a 
series of activities by Alston and Rosa.  Indictment, Overt Acts 
at ¶¶ 1-14; App. at 13a-16a.  The majority's repeated 
characterization of these activities as "structuring activities" 
ignores Count I paragraph 7(a), which proffers an alternative 
characterization of the facts. 
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nevertheless entertain a charge of conspiracy to defraud based 
upon broader allegations of money laundering.  Id. at 1432.  The 
government argued that the CTR was a thread in a larger web of 
transactions designed to thwart the IRS in the performance of its 
duties.  The court refused to consider these broader allegations 
because "[t]he indictment d[id] not allege a conspiracy to 
defraud premised upon the defendants' entire laundering 
operations.  It is far more narrowly drawn . . ..  Therefore, the 
indictment before us does not properly allege a conspiracy to 
defraud."  Id. (citing United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 
1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 This case is clearly distinguishable from Murphy.  In 
Murphy, the government attempted to switch the factual basis and 
legal theory of its case from defendants' currency transactions 
to a broader charge encompassing the whole of defendants' money 
laundering operations, even though this broader charge was not 
alleged in the indictment.  In this case, however, the government 
has not attempted to switch either its factual allegations or its 
legal theories.  The indictment clearly alleged a § 371 
conspiracy to defraud in Count I, paragraph 7(a), based upon the 
"Overt Acts" alleged in the indictment.  The government has 
alleged the same Klein conspiracy to defraud based upon the same 
facts throughout the proceedings.  Where the government attempted 
in Murphy to switch factual scenarios and legal theories 
midstream, the government in this case merely seeks affirmation 
of the conspiracy to defraud that it alleged in the district 
court.  Murphy is completely inapposite. 
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Mens Rea Necessary for Conviction 
 The majority's second major contention is that Alston 
cannot be convicted of a § 371 conspiracy to defraud the United 
States unless he possesses the requisite mens rea for conviction 
of structuring or conspiracy to structure as set out in Ratzlaf. 
The majority states that "the charge against Alston for 
conspiracy to defraud, which was premised exclusively on Alston's 
structuring activity, must be vacated for failure to prove the 
mens rea (knowledge of illegality) required not only by the 
underlying substantive offense of structuring, but also by the 
conspiracy to defraud by structuring."  Majority Op. at ___ [slip 
op. at 15]. 
 The majority refers to the crime of which Alston was 
convicted as "conspiracy to defraud by structuring" at least four 
times in its opinion.  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 3-4, 13, 
15, 20].  This formulation is indicative of what I believe to be 
a fundamental flaw in the majority's conception of this case. See 
supra note 6.  The crime for which Alston was actually convicted, 
of course, is a § 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States.  
The indictment alleges this conspiracy to defraud in a separate 
paragraph that does not include any reference to structuring.  
Indictment, Count I at ¶ 7(a); App. at 12a. Section 371 does not 
refer to "structuring" or conspiracy to defraud "by structuring."  
Congress included nothing in § 371 to indicate that the 
requirements for a § 5322 structuring conviction should be 
grafted onto a prosecution for a § 371 conspiracy to defraud the 
United States.  Without aid of close statutory interpretation or 
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legislative history, the majority unilaterally amends § 371 to 
add the words "by structuring" and thereby allows all of the 
requirements for a § 5322 conviction to slip into a § 371 case 
where they do not belong.0 
 The gravamen of the majority's argument seems to be 
that there is something improper about basing the case for a §371 
violation on the same so-called "structuring" behavior for which 
the government failed to obtain a conviction under § 5322. See, 
e.g., Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 15].  The majority 
observes that there is no difference between "the government's 
'defraud' scenario and the 'structuring' scenario of which Alston 
was acquitted."  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 18].  Neither 
the government, nor the district court, nor I have ever argued 
that there is a difference between the factual scenarios 
supporting each charge.  There simply are two alternative 
charges, brought pursuant to two different statutes, based upon 
the same factual scenario.  Because 18 U.S.C. § 371 has a lower 
mens rea requirement than 31 U.S.C. § 5322, Alston's behavior is 
culpable under § 371, even though he lacked the mens rea to be 
convicted under § 5322. 
 It has long been recognized "that when an act violates 
more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute 
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any 
class of defendants."  United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
                                                           
0
 As we have already noted, the "defraud" clause of § 371 is an 
independent offense requiring no reference to any other statute 
in the U.S. Code.  Vazquez, 319 F.2d at 384. 
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123-24 (1979).  It does not matter that the government decides to 
invoke a general statute when a more specific criminal statute is 
available.  United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 565-66 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108 (1985) 
(per curiam); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46 
(1952); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 456 (10th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Carter, 526 F.2d 1276, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976)); 
United States v. Derezinski, 945 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 Thus, the government could have pursued a conviction in 
this case under the "defraud" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 371 alone, 
without ever bringing a charge for the more specific offenses of 
structuring or conspiracy to structure and without ever 
referencing 31 U.S.C. § 5322.  In that case, there would be no 
question of characterizing the facts as "structuring" or of 
imposing the Ratzlaf mens rea on a § 371 case.  We would simply 
examine the facts and compare them with the elements and mens rea 
necessary for conviction of a § 371 violation to determine 
whether Alston is guilty of a Klein conspiracy to defraud the 
United States.  See supra Part I.  I submit that this is 
essentially the case we now have before us.  If Alston's actions 
satisfied the requirements for a § 371 conspiracy to defraud the 
United States, it should not matter that he was acquitted of 
independent, narrower charges in a multiple-count indictment. 
Unless the majority can explain precisely which element of a §371 
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conspiracy to defraud the United States is lacking, we should 
affirm the district court. 
 The Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. 
Jackson is indistinguishable from this case.  33 F.3d 866 (7th 
Cir. 1994).  In Jackson, defendants were originally convicted of 
structuring, conspiracy to structure, and conspiracy to defraud 
the United States--the exact same charges of which Alston was 
originally convicted.  Id. at 867.  Pursuant to Ratzlaf, the 
court reversed the structuring and conspiracy to structure 
convictions, but affirmed the § 371 conspiracy to defraud.  Id. 
at 868. 
 The majority argues that Jackson is distinguishable 
because it "involved additional charges in the indictment and 
additional evidence produced at trial, over and beyond that 
required for a conviction for pre-1994 structuring."  Majority 
Op. at ___ [slip op. at 19].  Contrary to the majority's 
assertion, however, the Jackson court never said that additional 
charges or evidence were necessary for a conviction on the § 371 
count.  The court's reasoning was quite clear: 
[Defendant's] first contention--that Ratzlaf requires 
reversal of the § 371 conviction--is misplaced because 
the government did not have to demonstrate that the 
defendants violated the antistructuring laws. Ratzlaf's 
holding concerning the meaning of "willfully violating" 
in the antistructuring laws, therefore, has no bearing 
on the defendants' § 371 convictions; § 371 contains no 
such language. 
Jackson, 33 F.3d at 871 (emphasis added). 
 The majority's attempts to distinguish Jackson miss the 
mark.  First, the majority argues that it is significant that the 
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Jackson indictment, in charging the § 371 count, "never mentions 
a structuring violation or the relevant antistructuring 
statutes."  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 19] (quoting 
Jackson, 33 F.3d at 870).  An examination of this sentence in 
context shows that it does not deserve the prominence that the 
majority gives it: 
[T]he government argues that a § 371 conspiracy to 
defraud the United States is an independent violation 
that need not be based on the violation of another 
substantive statute.  The government points out that 
count one of the indictment in this case, which sets 
forth the § 371 charge, never mentions a structuring 
violation or the relevant antistructuring statutes. 
Count one charges a conspiracy "to defraud the United 
States"; it does not allege a conspiracy "to commit any 
offense against the United States." 
Jackson, 33 F.3d at 870.  The Jackson court was merely 
emphasizing that the government alleged an independent conspiracy 
to defraud count and that that count is not dependent upon the 
other structuring counts--a point that I have emphasized and that 
supports a conviction on the independent § 371 count.  The court 
meant nothing more by this statement, and it set out no general 
rule. 
 The majority's selected quotation from Jackson also 
fails to distinguish the language in the Jackson indictment from 
the language in the Alston indictment.  Paragraph 7(a) of the 
Alston indictment, like Count I in Jackson, "never mentions a 
structuring violation or the relevant antistructuring statutes." 
Even though the § 371 conspiracy to defraud charge is based upon 
the same facts as the structuring charges, it is framed as an 
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independent allegation in paragraph 7(a).  Thus any perceived 
"distinction" based upon this language is entirely illusory. 
 The majority's second "distinction" is equally futile. 
The majority argues that it is significant that Jackson involved 
other "extensive evidence" beyond structuring activity to 
demonstrate the conspiracy to defraud.  As examples of such 
extensive evidence, the majority cites the fact that defendants 
had no wage or income and that they spent over $300,000 to 
purchase homes and exotic automobiles.  Majority Op. at ___ [slip 
op. at 19]. 
 The Jackson court, however, never indicated that these 
additional facts were necessary for a conviction under § 371. The 
court "set[s] forth in detail the structuring activity of the 
defendants--as well as other evidence--that demonstrates a 
conspiracy to defraud the United States under § 371."  Jackson, 
33 F.3d at 868.  It does not mention or even allude to this 
"other evidence" when it explains its reasoning, however, and it 
never implies that such "other evidence" is essential for a 
conviction.  Id. at 870-71. 
 The majority not only fails to explain why other 
evidence of a conspiracy to defraud the United States is 
necessary for a conviction; it ignores the existence of 
additional evidence in this case.  There was evidence that 
Alston, like the defendants in Jackson, failed to file income tax 
returns.  Compare Alston, Crim. No. 93-445-1 at 10; Appellant's 
App. at 40 with Jackson, 33 F.3d at 869.  The majority offers no 
guidance as to how much "other evidence" is sufficient to support 
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a § 371 conviction.  Surely a failure to file income taxes is an 
indication that defendants had a motive to defraud the United 
States of information about large cash purchases that would 
otherwise appear in CTRs.  Again, the majority finds a 
"distinction" when there is no significant difference between the 
factual scenarios. 
 United States v. Derezinski, a case very similar to the 
case at bar,0 also supports the district court's reasoning. 
Derezinski was prosecuted under the "defraud" clause of § 371, 
even though he might have been prosecuted under the more specific 
"offense" clause.  945 F.2d at 1010.  Since specific statutes 
existed, Derezinski argued, "it is no longer appropriate for the 
Government to prosecute conspiracies to commit acts governed by 
those statutes under the general defraud clause."  Id.  The 
Eighth Circuit firmly rejected this argument: 
[Defendant's] arguments attempt to draw our attention 
away from the true issue in this case.  His claim that 
the Government is really charging him with conspiring 
to violate [specific substantive statutes] is simply 
not true.  The Government has steadfastly persisted in 
proving that [the defendant] participated in a Klein 
conspiracy to defraud the United States.  While it may 
be true that the Government could have also charged 
[the defendant] under the specific offense clause of 
section 371, it is well settled that when conduct 
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government 
may choose which statute it will apply.  [citing 
Batchelder].  The Government was within its discretion 
when it decided to prosecute [the defendant] under the 
general defraud clause of section 371. 
                                                           
0
 Like the defendant in this case, Derezinski was prosecuted 
under the defraud clause of § 371 for a Klein conspiracy that 
consisted, inter alia, of circumventing the financial reporting 
requirements of a financial institution.  Derezinski, 945 F.2d at 
1009-10. 
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Id.  It should make no difference to the § 371 prosecution in 
this case that the government failed to obtain convictions under 
the substantive statutes.  
 Most importantly, the Eighth Circuit denied 
Derezinski's challenge to the district court's jury charge 
regarding intent.  Derezinski argued that because the criminal 
tax statute defining the specific offense required a showing of 
"willfulness" (as defined by Cheek v. United States), the 
government should bear the burden of demonstrating the same level 
of willfulness when pursuing a conviction under the "defraud" 
clause of § 371.  Id. at 1012 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 
U.S. 604 (1991)).  The Eighth Circuit flatly rejected this 
contention:  "Cheek does not apply to this case because the 
Government prosecuted Derezinski under a general conspiracy 
statute, not a criminal tax statute, and because 'willfulness' is 
not an express element of section 371."  Likewise, Ratzlaf does 
not apply to this case.  The government prosecution at issue is 
pursuant to § 371, not § 5322.  "Willfulness" is not an express 
element of § 371. 
 The majority offers United States v. Curran as 
authority to support its argument concerning mens rea.  Majority 
Op. at ___ [slip op. at 13-14] (citing United States v. Curran, 
20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994)).  The majority's reading of Curran 
would make § 371 dependent upon the level of mens rea necessary 
for a conviction under § 5322.  Thus the majority's analysis of 
Curran conflicts directly with Vazquez's statement that the 
"defraud" clause of § 371 is an independent charge that need be 
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based on no other part of the U.S. Code.  It also conflicts with 
the analysis of § 371 in Derezinski and Jackson.  I do not 
believe that we intended in Curran to overrule Vazquez or to 
change radically our reading of the defraud clause of § 371.  I 
also do not believe that the majority's interpretation of 
Curran's holding comports with a close reading of that case. 
 The defendant in Curran was prosecuted for causing 
campaign treasurers to make false statements to the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC).  The defendant could not be prosecuted 
directly under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for concealing material facts and 
making false representations, however, because it was the 
campaign treasurers, rather than the defendant, who prepared the 
false reports and submitted them to the Commission.  Curran, 20 
F.3d at 567.  The government therefore used 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) in 
conjunction with § 1001 to charge defendant with causing campaign 
treasurers to file false reports.  Section 2(b), like 31 U.S.C. 
§5322, requires "willfulness" on the part of the defendant in 
order to sustain a conviction.  Relying on Ratzlaf, we 
interpreted § 2(b) "willfulness" in cases brought under §§ 2(b) 
and 1001 in the federal election law context to mean that the 
prosecution must prove that "defendant knew of the treasurers' 
reporting obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those 
obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful."  Id. at 
569 (emphasis added). 
 The indictment in Curran alleged that defendant caused 
treasurers of various campaign committees to make incorrect 
reports to the FEC.  Id.  Nevertheless, the trial judge 
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erroneously charged the jury that "as a matter of law, . . . 
defendant had a legal duty to disclose the facts in question to 
the agency in question, the Federal Election Commission or to 
make certain that [the] information would have gotten to them." 
Id.  (emphasis added).  In regard to intent, the trial judge 
erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it must find that 
the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful.  Id.  We 
therefore overturned the district court on two grounds:  (1) its 
charge erroneously placed the reporting duty directly on the 
defendant and (2) the instruction on § 2(b) and § 1001 
willfulness did not communicate the proper mens rea. 
 The majority's discussion of Curran begins with the 
definition of "willfulness" as it appears in §§ 1001 and 2(b). 
Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 14].  Because there is no 
"willfulness" requirement in § 371, this part of the Curran 
opinion is not directly applicable to this case.  See discussion 
Part I, supra.  The majority then addresses the section of the 
Curran opinion dealing with the "defraud" clause of § 371.  The 
majority quotes Curran as holding that the district court's 
misstatement of the legal standard for "willfulness" "undermined 
not only the substantive counts, but the conspiracy [to defraud] 
one as well.  The essence of conspiracy is an agreement to commit 
an act that is illegal."  Majority Op. at ___ [slip op. at 14] 
(citing Curran, 20 F.3d at 571). 
 A careful reading of Curran demonstrates that the 
majority's interpretation of this dictum is plainly incorrect. 
The paragraph from which the majority quotes reads in full: 
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 As stated earlier, the misstatement of the law 
applicable to the defendant's legal duty to disclose 
facts to the Commission amounted to plain error.  This 
misstatement undermined not only the substantive 
counts, but the conspiracy one as well.  The essence of 
conspiracy is an agreement to commit an act that is 
illegal.  If a jury is misled into considering as 
unlawful the omission of an act that the defendant is 
under no duty to perform, then a finding of conspiracy 
based on such conduct cannot stand.  It follows that 
the conspiracy count must therefore be vacated. 
Curran, 20 F.3d at 571 (citations omitted).  Reading these 
sentences in context, it is clear that we refer not to the 
district court's misstatement of the legal standard for 
"willfulness," as the majority contends, but to its misstatement 
of the defendant's duty to report to the FEC.  This portion of 
Curran, like most of the opinion, discusses the duty of defendant 
relative to that of the campaign treasurers, not the mens rea 
requirement for a § 371 conspiracy to defraud. 
 The majority's argument that Curran makes the defraud 
clause of § 371 dependent on the intent necessary for conviction 
of another offense, therefore, hinges entirely on one paragraph 
of dictum.  That paragraph says in pertinent part that: 
The comments we have previously made about the failings 
of the instruction on intent apply to the conspiracy 
count as well.  As noted in American Investors, 879 
F.2d at 1100, '[i]n order to prove a conspiracy, the 
government must show an agreement to commit an unlawful 
act combined with intent to commit the underlying 
offense.'  On retrial, the instructions on intent as to 
the conspiracy count must track those applicable to the 
substantive counts. 
Id. 
 Curran's restatement of the general rule for conspiracy 
does nothing to change the outcome in this case.   If the 
majority insists on reading this dictum to make § 371 dependent 
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upon §5322, Curran conflicts with Vazquez's holding that a count 
drawn under the defraud clause "need refer to no other statute 
than §371."  Vazquez, 319 F.2d at 384; see also Jackson, 33 F.3d 
at 870; Derezinski, 945 F.2d at 1010.  In case of a conflict, I 
believe that our decision is controlled by Vazquez. 
 Moreover, the quote from American Investors, upon which 
the Curran dictum relies, was taken from a general discussion of 
conspiracy, without specific reference to the "defraud" clause of 
§ 371 or to Vazquez.  Vazquez, on the other hand, explicitly 
stated a general rule for the "defraud" clause of § 371, 319 F.2d 
at 384; see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1942); a 
rule followed by this court and other courts in similar cases. 
See, e.g., Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1990); Jackson, 33 F.3d 
866 (7th Cir. 1994); Derezinski, 945 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Three sentences of dictum in a case almost entirely concerned 
with another legal issue should not serve to subvert our 
precedent as well as Congress' expression of the mens rea 
necessary for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The Curran 
language is simply too slender a reed to support the weight that 
the majority wishes it to bear. 
 For the above reasons, I conclude that Alston satisfies 
all of the elements necessary for conviction of a Klein 
conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
Nothing in Ratzlaf or in the structuring statutes themselves 
changes this fact, and the majority barely addresses it.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
